. Averaged capital per player as a function of the number of players obtained using analytical expressions for the evolution of the probability distribution. The paradox exists only for N = 3 and N = 6. Abstract Inspired by asynchronous cooperative Parrondo's games we introduce two new types of games in which all players simultaneously play game A or game B or a combination of these two games. These two types of games differ in the way a combination of games A and B is played. In the first type of synchronous games, all players simultaneously play the same game (either A or B), while in the second type players simultaneously play the game of their choice, i.e. A or B. We show that for these games, as in the case of asynchronous games, occurrence of the paradox depends on the number of players. An analytical result and an algorithm are derived for the probability distribution of these games.
Recently, new types of Parrondo's games have been introduced [1], termed cooperative Parrondo's games that incorporate the feedback through spatial neighbor dependence. These games are based on the state of player's nearest neighbors where the state refers to a player either being a winner or a loser in the previous game. Each of N players, arranged in a circle, owns a capital C i (t), i = 1, . . . , N, which evolves by combination of two games. Game A is the same as in the classical setup [2] ,[3], [4] , namely the probability of winning and losing is p (A) and 1 − p (A) respectively. Game B depends on the state of neighbors to the left and to the right of the player, i.e. whether they have won or lost in the previous game. Games A and B, when played individually may be losing or fair, while any kind of periodic or random alternation of games A and B turns out to be winning. In
[1], the evolution of probabilities in games B and C was studied using mean field type equations while in [5], referred to as paper 1, we have modeled the games as discrete-time Markov chains and we have derived the analytic form of the exact probability evolution equations. Inspired by these games, we introduce here two new types of cooperative games in which all players play simultaneously either game A or game B or any combination of these two games and we name these games "one dimensional synchronous cooperative games" in order to make distinction between the standard cooperative games which we termed "one dimensional asynchronous games". Essentially the difference from the asynchronous case is that at each turn of the game all players play simultaneously, again depending on the state of their neighbors, which in turn is the result of the previous game's outcome. Moreover, a combination of games A and B may be played in two distinctive ways. First, players may simultaneously play game A or game B in any predetermined or random order. We denote this game as A + B. Alternatively, each player may at each turn of the game chose randomly whether to play game A or game B, and we denote this game as A * B. In both cases the paradoxical result that games A + B or A * B may be winning while each game individually, A or B, may be losing, occurs and it depends on the number of players. Interestingly, for the set of probabilities introduced in [1], the paradox appears only for N = 3 and N = 6. We also introduce a set of probabilities for which a counterintuitive (paradoxical) result appears irrespective of the number of players with the exception of N = 4 and then only for the game of type I (A + B). As in the case of asynchronous games we derive the probability transition matrix for games B, A + B and A * B.
As in the case of asynchronous games, the analysis is performed via discrete time Markov chains (DTMCs) and we first derive the probability transition matrix for game B. Probabilities of winning in game B depend on the current state of left and right neighbors, denoted as a pair h k = (s k − 1 s k + 1), and with player at position k are given by p 
Game B
Let the initial state of the ensemble of players be i = (i 1 , . . . , i N )and the final f = (f 1 , . . . , f N ). Since at each moment of time all players play simultaneously and therefore change each individual state, the probability of transition is
where probabilities w depend on whether state f k is 1 (winning) or 0 (losing), and upon the probability of winning, i.e.
and where
denotes an ordered pair of k-th player's neighbors in the initial state. Writing r i = 1 − p i where i = 0, 1, 2 or 3, the probability transition matrix T (B) for N = 3 is
3) It may be immediately noticed that this matrix has no zero entries while for the asynchronous game B it is sparse, i.e. most of its entries are zero.
Game A+B (Type I)
The ensemble of players collectively chooses to play either game A or game B so that the probability transition matrix is
and γ represents the relative probability of playing game A, where we assume the value of one half. Matrix T (A) has a very simple structure in the unbiased case ( p (A) = 1/2) when all entries are equal to 1/8. In order to illustrate the above expression we calculate the probability of transition from state i = (001) to state f = (011). The transition i → f occurs when all players play either game A or game B, hence two possibilities are 
Therefore, the probability of transition from state (001) to (011) is
Similarly, each entry in the probability transition matrix T (A+B) may be written as the sum according to expression 4.
Game A*B (Type II) In this game each player randomly plays either game A or game B, thus individually contributing "noise" to the ensemble. In order to shed more light on the transition process we calculate the transition probability from state i = (001) to state f = (011). There are 2 N = 8 possible ways in which three player state may change from i to f :
